prayer

Well. I was about to write about the whole prayer dispute, and when I clicked 'Save as Draft' I got an error message after i was redirected to an error page and consequently I lost the numerous paragraphs of tightly argued prose elaborating the position I had articulated in sweeping strokes on the entry of 8 December 2005. I will attempt to reconstruct these here, but after working on it for like 30 minutes (without saving it, yeah, i'm a dumbass) i'm rather tired, so its bound to be somewhat sketchy.

First we ask what it means for there to be "scientific evidence" that "prayer works." Here's the obvious answer. Either (1) one can show by repeatable experiment that there is a positive correlation between the event (P) "A prays that E occur" and (O) "E occurs" or (2) one can show for any person A, and any event E, that there is a chain of scientifically observable events E1, E2, E3, ..., En such that Ei causes Ej (when i does not equal j) and such that P causes E1 and En cuases O. Most likely (1) will obtain before (2) in the course of scientific inquiry. And by "there is evidence that prayer has instrumental value" we simply mean that at least (1) is the case.

We must make a distinction. It may seem obvious and inconsequential at first, but in my opinion it lies at the heart of the matter. If we are not strict materialists then we may distinguish the super-natural world from the natural world. Think of these "worlds" as sets. So the set super-natural world is merely the complement set of the set natural world. Note that this is merely an analogy to illustrate how these two "worlds" are mutually exclusive.

Now, here's why this distinction is important. By definition, the business of science is the investigation of the natural world. Science simply cannot allow any notions from the super-natural world. Consequently such statements as "God does not exist" or "God does exist" are not statements belonging to a scientific arena of discourse (the scientific agon). Similarly statements such as "Prayer works" or "Prayer does not work" are not statements belonging to the scientific agon.

This conclusion may seem strange especially since we have already seen a clear condition under which we have evidence for the "instrumental value" of prayer--i.e. the condition (1). That is, it seems I have specified a clear criterion under which one is allowed to assert "Prayer works"--i.e. when condition (1) holds, so how can I then say that science cannot make a statement about prayer when clearly I have shown it can do so? The first, intuitive, response is to say that science is not really talking about prayer but an idealization of prayer. By itself this claim does not really amount to a refutation of the objection just stated. But it does gain some validity if we rephrase it in the following way: certainly, if condition (1) holds, then prayer works, but that does not mean (we have not yet investigated this) that if prayer works, then condition (1) holds. We cannot yet claim that the concept of prayer is exhausted by condition (1), therefore condition (1) is not really a criterion for prayer working but is merely a sufficient condition for prayer to work.There may be something to prayer which (1) does not account for.

Consider the following argument: "There is no statistical evidence of the instrumental value of prayer, therefore prayer does not work." (I am not quoting anybody but just giving my rendering of Mr. Cline's argument against prayer...unfortunately at this time I am not able to access his web-site so I cannot give a direct quote...if I have misrepresented his argument I would gladly accept correction on this matter.)We may render this argument in the following way:

(A) Condition (1) does not hold.
(B) If condition (1) does not hold, then prayer does not work.
(C) Therefore, prayer does not work.

This is simple modus ponens so the argument is obviously valid, but for now it is not clear whether or not the argument works since we have not yet settled the question as to whether (B) is true. But deciding whether or not (B) is true leads us into an interesting quandry. This is because the truth of (B) hinges upon the meaning of the term 'prayer.' What concept does this term denote? According to a scientific world-view the concept of prayer involves, essentially, what we have already stated as condition (1). Prayer consists of a person A desiring that E occur (e.g. someone's being cured of a disease or so and so being (not) elected to the Presidential office), and so A prays for E to be the case. And, according to this same scientific outlook, it is absurd to say that this sort of thing would be successful if E in fact did not occur. I can identify with this sort of scientific intuition about prayer: in what sense is it possible to say that prayer works even if E does not occur? It would seem to be the height of folly to say that a prayer "worked" and yet E did not occur. But this is only a scientific outlook, not the only possible way of looking at the situation. It is only the "height of folly" for the scientist/logician. So according to the scientific world-view, (B) does in fact hold true simply because the concept of prayer is identified (made equal to) the concept of condition (1) holding true. So according to the scientific outlook the argument is also a sound one.

But is the concept of condition (1) holding true the most just rendering of the concept of prayer? Many would disagree with such a statement, I think, and this is why the above argument cannot be accepted by all: (B) is not true for those who understand 'prayer' to mean something more/entirely different than merely (1).

Furthermore, science, by its very nature, cannot possibly say more about prayer than (1). This is because of the distinction we made earlier between the natural and the non-natural worlds. The condition (1) is given entirely in naturalistic terms--observable, documentable events--and this is all that a scientific statement can ever do. But in order to provide a just rendering of the concept of prayer perhaps one must cross the barrier between the natural and non-natural worlds into the non-natural.

I must stress that my mind is not as clear about this distinction as about some of the other things I have said. I'm not even sure at this point (as I was when I first started writing this entry) that the natural/non-natural world distinction is really a distinction at all. To be sure it is one that gets thrown around a lot, but often I wonder if its all just a linguistic trick and that there really isn't a hard and fast distinction between the two. But such a reservation comes from my more scientific personality, so I cannot allow that free reign just yet. I think the argument that I have given against Mr. Cline's argument can be leveled even without the notion of natural versus non-natural by using the notion of a world-view or world-outlook which is something that can be understood a little better because, e.g., you can ask someone about their world view and thereby come to undersand their belief system as the result of that framework. The argument becomes, then: (B) is true for the scientific world view but not for world view X, therefore the argument does not work.

Really, this is an even better argument than before. The notion of natural vs. non-natural is not really an absolute distinction but a relative one: one's world-view will determine its validity or if it is valid what things go into which category.

Note also that I am applying a principle of argument critique which, according to many perspectives is dubious (perhaps even from my own perspective at times): If a proposition P is true for world view X, but not for world view Y then P is not objective and its truth is un-decidable from either perspective X or Y. This principle was just used in my argument that the argument concluding (C) is not sound.

At least a few comments about this principle are in order since it seems to be some sort of relativistic principle. Well...it is. I am unapologetic about that because I have my moral reasons for holding it which stem from my own world view which could be characterized as a sort of philosophical altruism with respect to other world views. I can sum this philosophy up in the "motto" (though I hate mottos) that all perspectives are valid but it is not the case that "anything goes," but it is also not the case that what does go is held by any privileged world view. Well...i guess that's not really a motto...too long and complicated. Anyway, this is the basic assumption which informs my critical principle mentioned above.

This implies that while it is fine for world view X to hold that P is false, X cannot criticize world view Y for holding that P is true, nor vice versa. You can be a scientist and hold that prayer is a bunch of nonsense because there is no insturmental value to it but that does not give you the right to criticize those who think that prayer is anything but nonsense. This is because to do so is to deny their experience as human beings. If there is anything evil in this world it is surely this: to deny the experience of another human being simply because it does not square away with your own experience.

Anyone wishing to comment on this at length can do so by sending me an email (pennedav@yahoo.com) since the commenting feature on this blog is pretty poor. I'm hoping to change that sometime.

Anyway, now it's snowing outside real nice and I want to go get some lunch.

Melting

The ice cap that's been covering central Kansas for the past couple of weeks is finally beginning to melt. The streets have become streams lined with piles of dirty snow that's been plowed up by tractors trying to clear them. The sun feels very warm; it's finally above freezing after having been in the 10 - 20 range for over a week. Stepping outside feels like one giant sigh and stretch after a good night's sleep. Unfortunately I'm writing all this in choppy sentences. But I still like the cold, I think, even though the warmth is nice. The past week I've loved going out and bracing the single digit temperatures with my scarf and cap; now it's over for a time and I can go out without having a scarf or cap or my coat buttoned up tight. The wind blows over my head. The side of my body turned towards the sun feels the warmth of the sun after not knowing this phenomenon for some time. I am torn between the oposing forces of the sensual comfort of the warmth and the seductive masochism of the cold.

discussion

Today in Earth Science we had a "forum" discussing issues of faith and science. It's easy to see how it could be frustrating to be involved in such conversations where just about every single other student is a traditional age freshman who hasn't really ever thought about these things before nor have they even begun any sort of training in how to think clearly (i.e. to be a philosophy major). The major difficulty with this is that it's hard to keep the discussion focused. That's the difference between someone who's capable of thinking clearly and someone who's not: keeping focused during a discussion and searching for a mutual understanding of the meanings of terms (or at least what are the possible meanings of those terms). Of course this is something which is difficult to do. Some people can do this naturally, they're the best people to talk to. I think I have maybe one or two friends who can actually do this. (I can't...i.e. i'm not a natural). But I think it's possible to develop it as a skill, but you have to do a lot of writing, thinking, and discussing. And it requires one to hold a lot of information in one's head at a given moment during a conversation. If one cannot do this then the discussion deteriorates into a mere wandering without any overall direction. This didn't happen today, fortunately. Unfortunately, I don't think it's because people in this class are clear thinkers, rather, the conversation didn't deteriorate because only a few people (out of like 30 students) were actually talking. These people don't seem to care too much. Maybe they do...i don't know. We'll it's almost 8:00pm here...time for 24.

waves & intuition

We talked about oceans today in Earth Science class and waves and all that stuff. But all the while my mind was on intuitionism...a philosophy of mathematics. this particular philosophy focuses on the constructive nature of mathematics. it remedies the antinomes of classical mathematics (e.g. Russell's paradox) by disallowing the use of infinite totalities taken as entirely given. the theory's rational for this is that one cannot ever fully construct (in any way) an infinite totality, e.g. the numbers 1, 2, 3, so on (since there's always something more to be constructed...i.e. the nature of being infinite). The paradoxes arise because of classical mathematics' taking an infinite totality as given absolutely and actually. This goes beyond what one's mind can "see" and so one cannot hope to be sure that one's constructions using these infinite totalities will be consistent whereas if one remains with what one can see clearly, i.e. the method of constructing the numbers 1, 2, 3, ..., 10, 11, 12, 13, ..., 100, 101, 102, and so on then one cannot ever arrive at a contradiction because what one sees clearly cannot admit of a contradiction. contradiction arises only when we try to say something about that which we cannot see clearly, e.g. the set of natural numbers taken as a completed whole, the set of all sets taken as a whole, etc. because we have no grasp of these things except in a very nebulous metaphysical way. Interestingly enough a lot of mathematics can be done this way, though it comes at the cost of a little more complexity. I find it highly interesting because it considers the only true mathematical meaning of a statement such as "M exists" (where M is some mathematical object such as a set or a number or a triangle) to be "M is constructible" (i.e. one can effect a construction in one's mind [possibly using paper and pencil as aid to this]). All other possible meanings are "metaphysical" and therefore not mathematical. This is good.

I don't know why i tried to say all that because the ideas are incredibly complex and I myself am only beginning to see them. Just thought i'd say something about what the hell i'm doing these days intellectual-wise.

Aaaaahhhhhh

Interestingly enough I still cringe at the thought of doing any serious writing after last semester. Hopefully that feeling will go away by the time Spring semester rolls around. This is bound to be a rather banal post, unfortunately. It snowed a bit, iced a lot here, but now it's beginning to melt--not in one of those crazy Kansas ways where one morning the temperature decides to skyrocket above freezing and all the snow and ice just melts of in like six hours; today it's just a little above freezing--enough to make the ice on the roads into dirty slushy stuff.

Relative to last Interterm, this one sucks. Last January I took Philosophy of Language (if I wasn't a philosophy nerd before that class, I certainly was after it), and this January I'm taking Earth Science to get my damned lab science Gen-Ed requirement out of the way finally. I find it highly annoying that the labs I had to do for Calc I (and then taught those same labs two years later) don't qualify as a lab science class even though the math major is officially named "Mathematics/Mathematical Sciences." I guess math labs don't count as science. Strange. Oh well. The only thing that sucks about Earth Science is that between all of my middle school science classes and like four years of watching Bill Nye the Science Guy I've heard it all before so it gets pretty annoying to sit in a class three hours each day and hear it all over again. Oh well.

Last night I went to a basketball game.